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Understanding online jihadi radicalisation in India

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Abstract
Online jihadi radicalisation has emerged as a consequential threat to India's national security. Terrorist organisations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda are increasingly exploiting digital platforms to disseminate extremist ideologies, recruit individuals, and incite violence. The widespread use of social media, encrypted messaging apps, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) has allowed these groups to craft and spread false narratives that primarily target youth. These efforts often involve psychological manipulation, propaganda, victimhood narratives, and calls to martyrdom. This article examines the growing presence of online radicalisation in India, considering the cases from the National Investigation Agency (NIA), news portals, and other literary sources. It also explores the nature of radicalisation in India and the role online platforms play in amplifying extremist content.

Keywords: Online radicalisation, violent extremism, terrorism, indoctrination

Introduction
The Indian delegation, at the 19th INTERPOL Heads of NCB Conference in Lyon, stated that online radicalisation poses a major threat to global security. India's concern is natural because, in recent decades, cases of online radicalisation have increased significantly. Terrorist attacks in India are often carried out by young people who are radicalised through online content. India emphasised that the international community should support India in eliminating terrorism and combating online radicalisation. India asserted that both the creators and consumers involved in these activities should be held accountable. Terrorist groups are increasingly using advanced technologies like AI to create false narratives and encrypted apps such as Signal, Telegram, Viber, WhatsApp, and the Dark Web to recruit, train, and spread radical ideologies, making it harder for security agencies to trace them. The National Investigation Agency (NIA), along with various state police departments, investigated 67 cases related to online radicalisation in 2024. These investigations led to the arrest of 325 individuals, with 336 people formally charged and 63 (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2022) [17]. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) also blocked a total of 9,845 URLs by October 2024, many of which were found to contain radical or extremist content (Bott *et al*., 2006) [6]. The Indian government is cautiously monitoring content on social networks and other online platforms due to their immense potential to spread radical and extremist ideologies. These platforms, in particular, pose a higher risk of influencing vulnerable people, especially young people.

Understanding Radicalisation
Academic Definitions
Let us try to understand the meaning of radicalisation according to various scholars: According to Taarnby (2005) [38], radicalisation is "the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to militant Islamist" (Taarnby, 2005) [38]. This view clearly defines radicalisation as a problem in Islam. Ashour (2009) [1] defines radicalisation as "a process of relative change in which a group undergoes ideological and/or behavioural transformations that lead to the rejection of democratic principles (including the peaceful alternation of power and the legitimacy of ideological and political pluralism) and possibly to the utilisation of violence, to an increase in the levels of violence, to achieve political goals" (Ashour, 2009) [1]. Here, radicalisation is seen as a precursor to violence and a threat to democracy. Crenshaw, M. *et al*. have stated that radicalisation is "the quest to drastically alter society, possibly through the use of unorthodox means, which can result in a threat to

the democratic structures and institutions" (Crenshaw, 2001) [8]. It perceives radicalisation as a threat to established institutions. Sinai is of the view that radicalisation is "the process by which individuals-on their own or as part of a group-begin to be exposed to, and then accept, extremist ideologies" (Sinai, 2012) [36]. Here, the process involves exposure, acceptance, and extremism sequentially. In the 2011 special issue of the International Journal of Conflict and Violence, guest editors Donatella Della Porta and Gary LaFree referred to seven different definitions of radicalisation in their introduction, titled Processes of Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation. They explained that radicalisation involves a shift in how people view a situation, often leading to more extreme and absolute beliefs. This process can develop into strong hostility toward certain social groups or institutions and can also include a growing acceptance or use of violence to achieve goals (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012) [10]. Peter Neumann once described radicalisation as "what goes on before the bomb goes off," that is, the process of the initial stages of violence (Neumann, 2008) [28]. It may sound indecorous and suggestive, but in reality, it is encircling the veracity. The definition provided by the Canadian government is quite ambiguous, as it describes radicalisation as the process through which individuals are influenced by intense ideological messages, causing them to shift from moderate, mainstream beliefs toward more extreme positions (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2009) [30]. The lack of understanding of radicalisation, with interconnected issues such as violence and religion, makes this understanding incomplete and unrelated to the underlying problem. It merely alludes to extremism without explicitly addressing the element of violence, which is a critical component of the broader discourse on radicalisation. The Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, established by the European Commission in 2006 to examine the state of academic research on radicalisation leading to violence, particularly terrorism, stated in its 2008 report Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, and Counter-Radicalisation that "radicalisation is a context-bound phenomenon par excellence. Global, social, and political factors matter as much as ideological and psychological factors. " The group adopted a definition of violent radicalisation as the 'socialisation to extremism manifested in terrorism'. It also conceptualises radicalisation as "the phenomenon of people accepting opinions, views, and ideas which could lead to acts of terror" (European Commission, 2008) [11]. It explains radicalisation as the process of extreme negative and unorthodox socialisation, which ultimately leads to violence and terror-related activities in most cases. To understand the Western understanding and approach to radicalisation, it is important to examine other definitions. According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), radicalisation is "the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect social change" (Homeland Security Institute, 2006) [14]. In my opinion, the term 'social change' is muffled and obscured here, as it carefully denies accepting the actual positioning of radicalism, which aligns itself not only with social change, but also with political disarray and religious conversions. It notably omits the term "terrorism" and fails to clarify what constitutes an extremist belief system, thereby limiting its conceptual clarity. This definition also seems to tilt towards the viewpoint that radicalisation is not inherently synonymous with terrorism, and individuals who undergo radicalisation may still be receptive to intervention. I must admit that there is a small possibility of the reintegration of radicalised individuals into moderate, mainstream belief systems through deradicalisation methods in a few cases. But despite this small possibility, it cannot be denied that the latent threat is bigger here than the existing chance. Let us take the perspective of UNDP, which states that radicalisation often leads to violent extremism and primarily affects young people, although individuals from any religious, educational, or social background can be impacted. UNDP primarily focuses on the causes of radicalisation and methods of de-radicalisation in its discourse paper. It suggests that people are drawn into violent movements through deliberate influence, often driven by personal or emotional factors such as isolation, identity crises, or experiences of injustice, etc., along with socio-political factors (poverty, riots, regime change, etc.) and corruption. Social media plays a trivial role in this process. As the process comes near to its completion, people are drawn towards violent extremism, which is essentially intolerant. According to UNDP, religious extremists are typically characterised by their rejection of peaceful coexistence and their opposition to the principles of freedom, choice, and dissent (United Nations Development Programme, 2016) [41].



Fig 1: A chart showing the process of violent extremism through radicalisation (United Nations Development Programme, 2016) [41].

The above chart illustrates the underlying factors and processes that contribute to individuals gravitating toward radicalisation and how, through targeted recruitment efforts, they may progressively transition toward violent extremism. In summary, scholarly perspectives and institutional definitions suggest that radicalisation constitutes an unconventional and nonconformist form of extreme socialisation, wherein individuals engage with violent/extremist/terrorist groups, individuals, and organisations. This process often aims to promote forced religious conversions, violent extremism, terrorism, systemic disruption, and intolerance. Radicalisation is a way to foster terrorist activities that undermine democracy and human rights. This process is influenced by a complex interplay of individual, religious, social, ideological, political, and psychological factors. India does not have a singular, codified official definition of "radicalisation" in its legal statutes. In 2020, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs approved India's first official academic study on the "status of radicalisation" led by Professor G.S. Bajpai, Director of the Centre for Criminology and Victimology at National Law University, Delhi. Its primary objectives are to propose a legal definition of radicalisation and recommend possible amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) (Hindustan Times, 2020) [2]. There is an urgent need for India to clearly define radicalisation and develop empirically grounded de-radicalisation strategies to effectively address the challenge of terrorism within the country.

Why Online Platforms?

In today's digital age, extremist groups use the internet for many purposes. These include spreading propaganda to wide audiences, raising funds, collecting open information, planning attacks, and communicating with members and other groups. They also share instructions for making explosives, recruiting and training followers, and promoting violent acts to gain attention. Online information campaigns are a key part of radicalisation. Extremist groups use digital platforms to influence and reach people. The Islamic State (IS), in particular, has shown the ability to use the internet effectively for spreading its ideology. Along with its members, many online supporters help promote a shared effort to increase feelings of alienation among Muslim youth in different countries (D'Souza, 2015) [9]. Terrorist organisations exploit a wide range of online platforms and tools to disseminate their radical and troubled ideologies, recruit members, and spread violent content and false narratives. They manage social media networks such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube to reach global audiences, circulate propaganda, and share misleading information through hashtags, videos, images, and public posts. Encrypted messaging applications like WhatsApp, along with emails and other communication tools, are employed for direct engagement and coordination. Additionally, they distribute digital content through e-magazines, online pamphlets, downloadable materials, and hyperlinks. Emerging technologies, including deepfake media and AI-generated content, further enhance their ability to manipulate narratives and influence public perception to a great extent. Most of the users of these platforms and communication channels are ordinary individuals who are unable to verify any of the information or identity provided by radicalisers. Extremist groups use audio and video content, such as footage of attacks on places of worship, to evoke strong emotional responses and incite violence. These materials are often designed to appeal to vulnerable individuals, particularly youth, by presenting a distorted sense of purpose and identity (Awasthi, 2025) [3]. Deepfake videos of genocide of a certain community to seek sympathy or footage of army exercises at unidentified locations to call people to join the cause of bringing caliphate rule, short propaganda stories against western culture and the idea of freedom and democracy, can commonly be found on any radicalised channel. Understanding the motivations behind terrorists' use of online tools is essential to grasp the causes of online radicalisation. Several factors contribute to their preference for digital platforms:

1. They are cost-effective and require minimal financial resources.
2. They are widely available and easily accessible to anyone with internet access.
3. They enable rapid dissemination of content across platforms.
4. They can reach vast audiences within a very short time frame.
5. Young and tech-savvy generations, such as teenagers and youth, can be easily influenced and manipulated.
6. Creating and sharing online content demands relatively little time and effort.
7. Digital spaces, including the dark web, offer users a high degree of anonymity.
8. Online platforms allow for interactive communication and engagement.
9. Online games can be both entertaining and immersive, serving as subtle tools for indoctrination.
10. Advanced digital technologies and AI facilitate the creation of false narratives through manipulated or edited content.

In summary, online tools are easy, accessible, efficient, and possess immense potential for creating, disseminating, and facilitating content with boundless recipients. Radicalisation is a planned process that possesses various stages and has multiple methods aimed at achieving specific objectives. While these objectives may differ depending on the planning, context, and region, the underlying foundation often revolves around the use of terror and violence.

Terrorist organisations employ a range of strategies to radicalise individuals. Some of the foundational strategies of radicalisation are outlined below:

Indoctrination

Indoctrination involves inculcating specific beliefs and ideas by repeated instructions to the point where they are accepted without question, leaving no room for critical thought. This stage introduces an alternative, often distorted, reality designed to shape the individual's perception. It is a crucial step in gaining loyalty and polarising individuals toward the extremist cause. According to research, terrorist groups use psychological manipulation to radicalise young people by fostering submission, promoting political-religious indoctrination, and encouraging violent behaviour. These techniques are subtle and gradually convince individuals that violence is necessary to achieve their goals. Common strategies include controlling thoughts (by limiting attention and discouraging critical thinking), controlling information,

and using authoritarian leadership to influence emotions (González, 2022) [12]. For example, Karnataka-born Mohammed Shafi Armar, the chief recruiter for ISIS in the Indian subcontinent, was a tech-savvy terrorist. Famous for his technical skills, Armar used platforms like Facebook and private messaging services to contact, indoctrinate, and recruit youth from India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Interrogations of suspected ISIS operatives revealed that Armar played a key role in motivating and radicalising Muslim youth in India. His efforts were primarily directed toward recruiting for Jund ul Khalifa-e-Hind through online radicalisation methods (NDTV, 2017) [27]. Online radicalisation is done through various platforms like YouTube channels, e-magazines, online meetings through various apps, personalised chats in chatrooms, echo chambers, etc.

Vengeance

Extremist narratives frequently portray their group or community as victims. This strategy is used to generate sympathy and justify violence by appealing to emotions like anger and revenge. It reinforces the belief that their actions are a necessary response to perceived injustice. Vengeance is a powerful emotion. It's an obsessive drive that is responsible for extreme violence. For example, according to security experts and government agencies, most of the terrorists in India hailed from severely affected, riot-hit areas. Between 2001 to 2007, more than 71% of all communal incidents in the country took place in the very same states where these terrorists hail, that is, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh (Bhaumik, 2009) [4]. It explains the close relationship between vengeance and terrorism. Videos calling to avenge injustice or to take revenge from “them” and Hijr at the places of holy war are now common in these radicalized circles. The Islamic State issued a video in 2019 showing its leader, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” delivering a message to his followers, urging them to seek revenge for the fall of the terror group's caliphate in Syria and Iraq. He described the terror group's war as a "battle of attrition" and "stretching the enemy," and promised ISIS would seek revenge for the elimination and incarceration of its fighters. Baghdadi also commended ISIS fighters "in the provinces" for seeking revenge, claiming they had executed almost 300 operations across eight nations, before addressing the Easter Sunday terror attacks in Sri Lanka (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020) [37]. It tries to justify violence as a punishment inflicted upon non-believers for their wrongdoings. Blaming the victims for the violence is a part of the nature of terrorism. Ironically, these Terrorist groups portray themselves as victims of violence and injustice for which they have to take revenge.

Martyrdom

It aims to instil a sense of pride so strong that individuals become willing to sacrifice their lives- and take the lives of others- for the cause. They begin to see themselves as morally superior and view their mission as the ultimate purpose, above all else. Martyrdom is glorified to promote jihad and promise divine rewards from Allah after death. These promises often include visions of the afterlife featuring virgins, servants, and peaceful imagery such as waterfalls and lounging lions, all used to entice and motivate recruits (Wedeck & Baskin, 2015) [43]. ISIS has historically viewed its online warriors as equally significant as its fighters engaged in attacks on the ground (Taneja, 2016) [39]. By instilling chimerical beliefs in the minds of potential recruits, ISIS radicalisers portray an idealised lifestyle for those who become martyrs. This depiction makes it easier to influence individuals to progress to the next stage of radicalisation. They not only promote a perfect life on earth but also present the afterlife as eternal bliss in Jannah (paradise) (Matusitz, 2014) [16]. Martyrdom or “shahada” in jihad is associated with “Death for the cause of Righteousness” on the battlefield. Dying for the cause of God is seen as the most glorified and reverent death. Martyrs are believed to be rewarded in the afterlife (in paradise).

Solidarity

It emphasizes unity and mutual support to strengthen bonds among group members, often using religious or ideological ties. It promotes solidarity among "believers" and draws a clear boundary between "us" and "them," fostering a strong in-group identity. It has been observed that many people are influenced to join radical or extremist groups by seeking solidarity with family members, peer groups or other close acquaintances (Borum, 2004) [5], and “the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or violence” (Crenshaw, 1988) [7]. Crenshaw has argued that “shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are much more important determinants of terrorist behavior than individual characteristics” (Crenshaw, 2001) [8]. Sageman examined the cases of about 172 global mujahideen and concluded that around 33% terrorists “joined” the jihad collectively as part of a small group or they had a close friend who had already joined (Sageman, 2004) [32]. The first introduction or exposure to the terrorist organization for fresh terror recruits comes from people of acquaintances. The recruitment was influenced and shaped by the individual’s solidarity with a "special" friend. A recruiter may also use fresh recruits to pick out other potential group members or leverage valuable relationships to “hook” the individual. That leverage can be emotional (e.g., emotional blackmail, generating feelings of satisfaction, reward, glory, or avenging harm done to a loved one) or material (e.g., financial advantage that may come to one’s family by martyrdom).

Hatred and Intolerance

Radicalisation fosters hatred and intolerance toward those who do not share the group's beliefs. Through psychological manipulation and other specified methods, targets are conditioned to view "them" as enemies, paving the way for justifying violence and furthering extremist objectives. For example, according to a case reported by the NIA, Mohammad Adil Khan, based in Madhya Pradesh, along with his associates, was involved in spreading ISIS propaganda both online through social media platforms and offline through Dawah programmes. Their ultimate aim was to carry out violent terror attacks in India. Khan used online platforms to motivate and recruit young individuals to join ISIS. A key member of the same module, Syed Mamur Ali, had also formed a local group called "Fisabilillah" and operated a WhatsApp group under the same name. Members of this group shared derogatory remarks about Hindu deities, reflecting their intense hatred and intolerance toward other religions (National Investigation Agency, 2023) [24, 25].

Online Radicalisation in India

In 2022, The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) invoked emergency powers under the Information Technology (IT) Rules, 2021, to block 16 YouTube-based news channels of which 10 were based in India and 6 in Pakistan—for disseminating disinformation related to national security, foreign relations, and public order in India. According to official reports, these channels were found to be engaged in spreading false and unverified information with the malafide intent to incite communal disharmony, create public panic, and disrupt societal stability. Some India-based channels were also involved in publishing content that labelled specific communities as terrorists and promoted inter-religious hatred, raising concerns over the potential for communal unrest. Collectively, the blocked channels had amassed a viewership of over 680 million, indicating the scale of their influence and the seriousness of the threat posed by such disinformation (Press Information Bureau, 2022).

There has been a significant rise in online jihadi radicalisation in India over the past five years. In recent years, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) has arrested several individuals accused of forming ISIS-linked modules, whose members allegedly used online social media platforms to plan and coordinate terrorist activities.

An analysis of recent cases investigated by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) reveals a clear trend: online platforms and digital tools have become powerful new instruments for terrorist groups to spread their ideology and recruit followers.

Table 1: Recent cases of Online Radicalisation in India reported in NIA (NIA cases).

S. No.	Case Title	Case No.	Date	Key Accused	Summary
1	Criminal Conspiracy to Wage War Against the Government of India	RC-01/2023/NIA/DLI	06-02-2023	Mohammad Saddam, Saeed Ahmed	Planned to overthrow the Indian government and establish a caliphate. Used online jihadi channels to recruit youth and collect arms/funds. (NIA, 2023)
2	ISIS Module Case - Kerala	RC-05/2021/NIA/DLI	05-03-2021	Mohammed Ameen (Abu Yahya)	Ran ISIS propaganda via Telegram, Hoop, and Instagram. Radicalized youth planned to move to J&K for terror activities (NIA, 2021).
3	Uploading Incriminating Content - Madurai, Tamil Nadu	RC-08/2021/NIA/DLI	26-04-2021	Muhammad Iqbal / Santhil Kumar	Uploaded anti-Hindu content on Facebook. Found to be in touch with ISIS and Hizb-ut-Tahrir members via social media (RC-08/2021/NIA/DLI, 2021).
4	Uploading of incriminating messages on social media by one supporter of Hizb-ul-Tahrir	RC-09/2021/NIA/DLI	21-05-2021	Abdullah / saravankumar	Posting incendiary messages on Facebook, instigating people on religious grounds to wage war against India and establish caliphate rule (RC-09/2021/NIA/DLI, 2021).
5	Qasim Sani @ Qasim Khurasani/ISIS case	RC-14/2021/NIA/DLI	29-06-2021	Qasim Sani / Qasim Khurasani	Online ISIS campaign to radicalize youth, content creation, editing, publication, and dissemination of ISIS magazine (RC-14/2021/NIA/DLI, 2021)
6	Radicalising, motivating & recruiting youth by Sajjad Gul, commander of LeT/TRF in J&K	RC-32/2021/NIA/DLI	18-11-2021	Sajjad gul(LeT/ TRF),saleem rehmani,saifullah sajid jutt	Online propagation (social media, messaging apps) of jihadi ideology to radicalize youth (RC-32/2021/NIA/DLI, 2021).

Terrorist modules are actively using online platforms and tools to radicalise Indian youths. Radical materials are freely and easily available on various webpages, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels. Jihadi ideology is spreading rapidly through online campaigns. Online propagation of jihadi content is not easy to track, prove and penalized due to democratic and secular structure of Indian state. Now let's take a look at some recent news related to online radicalisation cases in India:

Table 2: Cases of online radicalisation reported in various news outlets.

S. No	Case Title	Date of News and Source	Key Accused	Summary
1	Srinagar Zakura Attack	November 20, 2017, Tribune (India)	Mugees Ahmed Mir	Mugees Ahmed Mir, killed in a Srinagar attack on November 17, 2017, was inspired by Islamic State's online propaganda, wearing an IS T-shirt during the attack claimed by IS's Amaq agency (The Tribune, 2017) [40].
2	Mehdi Biswas Twitter Propaganda	December 2014, London's Channel 4	Mehdi Masroor Biswas	Mehdi Masroor Biswas, a Bengaluru engineer, ran the "@ShamiWitness" Twitter account, inciting IS recruits with translated Arabic posts. Arrested in December 2014, he was charged under IPC Section 125, conspiracy, and cyber-terrorism (London's Channel 4, 2014) [15].
3	Four Youths Joining ISIS	July 9, 2016, Times of India	Aarif Majid, Fahad Shaikh, Amaan Tandel, Saheem Tanki	Four Kalyan youths, Aarif Majid, Fahad Shaikh, Amaan Tandel, and Saheem Tanki, were indoctrinated via internet chat rooms and a Facebook intermediary to join IS in 2014. Majid, arrested by NIA, was charged under IPC Section 125 (Gupta, 2016) [13].
4	American School Bomb Plot	October 22, 2022, Hindustan Times	Anees Ansari	Anees Ansari, a software engineer, was arrested for planning to bomb the American School in Mumbai and indoctrinating an American youth online for a lone wolf attack. He was charged under the IT Act and IPC sections 120B, 302, and 115 (Shah, 2022) [34].

Table 3: List of online platforms used by Jihadists.

S. No	Media Channel Type	Name	Description
1	YouTube	Ansar AQIS	Al Qaeda's YouTube channel, now banned, previously had over 25,000 subscribers (Sharma, 2021) [35].
2	YouTube	Al Firdaws	Al Qaeda's YouTube channel, now banned, previously had over 25,000 subscribers (Sharma, 2021) [35].
3	YouTube	Tahaffuz-E-Deen India	Banned in 2022, with 109,970,287 views and 730,000 subscribers, involved in spreading disinformation and communal disharmony (Press Information Bureau, 2022).
4	YouTube	Kaiser Khan	Banned in 2022, with 49,628,946 views and 470,000 subscribers, involved in spreading disinformation and communal disharmony (Press Information Bureau, 2022).
5	E-Magazine	Nawai Afghan	Al Qaeda's online magazine, publishing statements in Urdu, English, Arabic, Bangla, and Tamil (Sharma, 2021) [35].
6	E-Magazine	Sawt-al-Hind (SAH, Voice of Hind)	Islamic State propaganda publication launched in February 2020 in New Delhi, focusing on regional issues (NIA Cases).
7	E-Magazine	Serat Ul Haq	The Islamic State-linked Al Jauhar Media publication called for articles in English and Indian languages for its 5th edition (Viswanathan, 2025) [42].
8	Media Wing	Al-Hurr	Official media wing of Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind (AGH), an Al Qaeda-linked Kashmir jihadist group, with Abu Ubaidah as spokesperson.
9	Media Wing	Al-Sindh	The media outlet used by AGH to release propaganda material.
10	Media Wing	Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF)	Platform used by Al Qaeda to share AGH press releases (SACM, 2021) [31].
11	Media Wing	Al Isabah Foundation	Unofficial Islamic State media outlet, circulating messages in Tamil, Malayalam, Hindi, Urdu, Telugu, and Kannada (Viswanathan, 2025) [42].
12	Media Wing	Al Jauhar Media	An Islamic State-linked media outlet pledged allegiance to the IS Amir in August 2023, producing Serat Ul Haq magazine (Viswanathan, 2025) [42].
13	Media Wing	Al-Kifah Media	Al Qaeda's official media arm, targeting South India with propaganda (Viswanathan, 2025).
14	Media Wing	Islamic Translation Center (ITC)	Al Qaeda's translation network, publishing in Tamil, Telugu, Kannada, and Malayalam to target South Indian sympathizers (Viswanathan, 2025) [42].

The nature of these cases indicates that terrorist organisations, like any other organization, function in a systematic manner, though there are no written rules to abide by. One may argue that these are just a few random cases which are insignificant in such a gigantic population, and my counterargument is:

1. Firstly, not all cases are caught, reported, or investigated. The actual numbers are definitely larger than that.
2. Secondly, the people involved in each of these cases are able to influence a big portion of this huge population. So, it would be an underestimation of the latent threat. Online radicalisation should be perceived with absolute commitment and determination to minimize the potential threat of terror-related activities. To come to a definite conclusion and characterize the nature of online radicalisation in India, it is also imperative to take a look at the list of online platforms used by terrorist organizations.

After studying all the NIA cases and media reports, along with the list above related to online radicalisation, a few points can be established:

1. Terrorist organisations are properly established, purposeful functioning systems working for a definite goal.
2. Many terrorist organisations have a separate functioning media wing for online radicalisation. This wing is responsible for spreading disinformation, communal disharmony, and the idea of jihad.
3. Terrorist modules are increasingly using social media networks and other online platforms to radicalize Indian youths.
4. Terrorist organisations working in India are focusing on the overthrow of the legitimate government by inciting communal violence and propagating jihadist ideology.
5. ISIS (known as a tech-savvy group) is actively recruiting Indian youths through online radicalisation.
6. Some specified regions in India are more at risk of youth radicalisation than others, for example, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, etc, due to various geographical and political reasons.
7. The increased use of vernacular languages in spreading jihadi propaganda indicate their targeted regions and social groups. It is noted that they are specifically targeting youths in South India.

Conclusion

Radicalisers are increasingly using the internet to find, influence, and recruit vulnerable individuals. They are able to do this by sharing extremist and often violent content, such as images, speeches, messages, and videos, on social media, messaging apps, gaming platforms, and online forums. To attract people, they use several tactics, including spreading fake news aimed at increasing fear, anxiety, and confusion. In India, the country's cultural and political diversity makes it more susceptible to such influence. Platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and X are commonly used to spread propaganda, bring people into extremist networks, and create communal tension. This form of online radicalisation is based on emotional and psychological manipulation. Extremist content often targets deep frustrations and grievances, leading individuals to feel anger or resentment. These messages usually present certain groups or institutions as enemies, making violence seem like a justified response. Over time, exposure to such material reduces sensitivity to violence and makes it seem acceptable. People may feel powerful or validated when supported by others with similar views online. In addition, extremist messages promote a sense of alienation and anti-government sentiment by portraying certain communities as oppressed or treated unfairly. This helps build a mindset of victimhood, making individuals more open to radical ideas. To address this growing threat, India needs a robust system

to identify, monitor, and report online radical content. This requires first creating a clear legal definition of radicalisation and supporting it with large-scale public awareness efforts to educate people and prevent manipulation.

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